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Drones and Machine Learning Analytics – The Best Way to Provide Privacy Safeguards 
on Drone Surveillance is with Technology, Not Law.  
By Victoria Dorum 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Mr. Marks, by mandate of the District of Columbia Precrime Division, I'm placing you 
under arrest for the future murder of Sarah Marks and Donald Dubin that was to take place 
today, April 22 at 0800 hours and four minutes.”1  
Imagine a world were crime could be predicted. Where you knew ahead of time who the 
perpetrator will be. That world may not be as far away as a figment of Hollywood’s imagination. 
Predictive policing is no longer a scientific concept society contemplated only possible in 
movies, it is as real as wireless communication and thermal imaging technology – all common 
things we now take for granted that used to be a thing futuristic imagination that society was not 
even sure is possible.  Other technologies that people do not think of as groundbreaking anymore 
are NSA surveillance and targeting advertising practices. These kinds of collections of 
information, data mining and machine learning techniques are now old news and though they are 
still subject of widespread controversy, we accept them as part of the world we live in. Soon, we 
may think the same way about another type of technological advance that stems from the latter 
two things - predictive policing using drone surveillance. 
Drones have many beneficial uses, including search-and-rescue missions, scientific 
research, mapping, disaster relief and more.2 But deployed without proper regulation, drones 
                                                        
1 Minority Report (Amblin Entertainment 2002) 
2 Atmel Staff, 18 awesome ways drones are being used today, August 8, 2014, available at 
http://blog.atmel.com/2014/08/08/18-awesome-ways-drones-are-used-today/. 
equipped with facial recognition software, infrared technology, and speakers capable of 
monitoring personal conversations, would cause unprecedented invasions of individuals’ privacy 
rights. Interconnected drones could enable mass tracking of vehicles and people in widespread 
areas. Tiny drones could go completely unnoticed while peering into the window of a home or 
place of worship. Thus, when it comes to drone surveillance, drones have been getting a lot of 
backlash from civil liberty groups like ACLU, criticism from scholars, lawyers and other 
members of society and perhaps fear from some of the legislators. While not without great 
constitutional concerns, the benefits of the use of drones for surveillance purposes greatly 
outweigh the risks when the risks are addressed and balanced out by a proper legislative 
framework that takes into account considerations of the precedent so far and the capabilities of 
current technology. Considering that some savvy criminals already posses sufficient control and 
command of this emerging technology to aid their criminal activities, failing to arm law 
enforcement officials with the same technological advancements as is available to civilians, in 
hopes of not just apprehending the criminals but also preventing crime and saving lives, because 
of lack of sufficient knowledge or misunderstanding of the current technological landscape 
would be equivalent to tying law enforcement’s hands while providing ammunition to their 
antipode.  
Part II of this paper briefly discusses current legislative background of drone surveillance 
with examples of legislations that have already been passed on law enforcement’s use of drones 
for surveillance purposes. Existing drone legislation is examined to determine what has been 
done by the states so far, the differences between legislations are examined to give a background 
for the discussion of what could or should be done differently in crafting future legal framework 
for drone legislation. Current legal background of other technologies that are used for 
surveillance purposes is discussed in Part III to introduce the bounds that are already established 
by past legislation and case law. It discusses cases and some legislation related to different types 
of surveillance such as aerial and aural surveillance to determine where drones fit in our existing 
legal framework and what are the boundaries that are already created for drone surveillance. Part 
IV examines current machine learning analytics technology and how it is currently used with 
considerations of existing legal framework in mind, this part sets out recommendation for a 
legislative framework for drone surveillance in law enforcement taking into account current and 
emerging technologies. This part provides recommendations for the most efficient and effective 
use of current and future technologies that would balance concerns expressed by the courts in 
cases that are examined in Part III of the paper and current criticisms by civil liberty 
organizations. It also focuses on emerging technologies that are expected to emerge in the next 
ten years to account for the changing landscape and evolution of technological advancement and 
provide an up to date legislation. Part V is titled Concerns, this part will analyze what concerns 
will be difficult to address with the proposed legislative framework and the policy issues that the 
courts and legislators will likely still face in light of this unexplored area of law.  
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
Since the beginning of 2013 legislative sessions, state lawmakers have considered many 
pieces of legislation addressing the use of drones. In 2015, 45 states have considered 168 bills 
related to drones and at least 41 states have considered drone legislations in 2016.3 Twenty 
states–Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, 
                                                        
3 Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx. 
Utah, Virginia and West Virginia–have passed 26 pieces of legislation.4 Four other states–
Alaska, Georgia, New Mexico and Rhode Island–adopted resolutions related to drones.5 
Georgia’s resolution established a House study committee on the use of drones and New Mexico 
adopted memorials in the house and senate requiring a study on protecting wildlife from drones.6 
Rhode Island's resolution created a legislative commission to study and review regulation of 
drones.7 Additionally, Virginia's governor signed an executive order establishing a commission 
on unmanned systems (as drones are often referred to).8 Florida and Kentucky have pre-filed 
bills for the 2016 legislative session.9 
Currently, 17 states have legislation relating to use of drones. Of those 17 states, 14 have 
legislation limiting how police can use drones.10 Members in the House and Senate introduced 
bills in the previous Congress that would have required police everywhere in the country to ob-
tain a warrant before using drones for surveillance, but the bills died at the end of the year.11 “In 
the states that don’t require warrants, it’s pretty much a Wild West” in terms of what’s allowed, 
says Jay Stanley, senior policy analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union.12 “There’s nothing 
stopping a police department from using [drones] in all kinds of ways to spy, except for the Con-
stitution.”13 
                                                        
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
7 State Regulation, Domesticating the Drone Evaluating Privacy Policy in the Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Within the US, INSCT (September 24, 2015), http://uavs.insct.org/state-regulation/. 
8 Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Waddell Kaveh, Few Privacy Limitations Exist on How Police Use Drones, NATIONAL JOURNAL (February 5, 
2015) available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/2015/02/05/few-privacy-limitations-exist-how-police-use-
drones#!. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
In current regulations, states, however, tend to border on extremes. In their complicating 
legislatives frameworks, states either ban unwarranted use of drones with very limited exceptions 
thus hindering law enforcement’s ability to use technology in conducting surveillance that it is 
otherwise allowed to conduct lawfully without the use of drones or states fail to regulate drone 
surveillance at all resulting in the ability to conduct drone surveillance without any kind of 
safeguards at all. For example, Idaho’s law restricting the government’s use of drones appears to 
impose strict restrictions on government drone use, but it contains some notable loopholes.14 
Law enforcement officers are generally required to obtain a warrant before using drones to 
gather information.15 However, it is unclear how this use of a drone is an effective way to 
conduct surveillance, since law enforcement officers would first have to engage in surveillance 
without a drone to obtain enough information to demonstrate probable cause so that they could 
obtain a warrant for use a drone to gather information. If the government fails to obtain a warrant 
and violates the statute, anybody whose image is wrongfully recorded by the drone can claim 
statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.16 But what is more interesting is that warrants are not 
required when the government is responding to an emergency or is carrying out a controlled 
substances investigation.17 This leaves a broad and unclear exception up to law enforcements’ 
interpretation, if there is a halfway house or an area or neighborhood where there is a prevalent 
use and sale activities of controlled substances, is law enforcement then allowed to use drones in 
that area pervasively? Can a drone be operated to conduct continuous surveillance of an 
individual who is subject to a controlled substances investigation without a warrant? And lastly, 
                                                        
14 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213(2) (2013). 
15 Id. 
16 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213(3) (2013). The statute’s restriction on drone use and the statutory damages 
provision applies to both the government and to private parties. 
17 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213(2) (2013) 
why did Idaho legislation decide that there is a compelling need for drones to be allowed to be 
used sans warrant in controlled substance investigations, but not in investigations of violent 
crimes or any other types of crimes? 
Florida’s law prohibits the use of drones by law enforcement without a warrant from a 
judge unless several narrow exceptions apply.18 Officers can use drones without a warrant when 
there is a significant risk of a terrorist attack, or when law enforcement officers are reasonably 
certain that the use of a drone is necessary to prevent imminent physical harm or the imminent 
escape of a suspect.19 These restrictions prevent law enforcement from using the help of a drone 
to conduct public surveillance in a lawful manner that they are otherwise allowed to conduct. 
The law further provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the law will be inadmissible 
in a criminal prosecution.20 
Illinois’s law regulating government drone use is similar to Florida’s law as outlined 
above.21 However, Illinois has several other exceptions to the warrant requirement, including 
provisions permitting law enforcement agencies to use drones without a warrant to locate 
missing persons, or to survey a crime scene or the scene of a traffic collision.22 
Indiana generally requires law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant before 
using drones.23 However, officers do not need to obtain a warrant when: exigent circumstances 
exist; there is a “substantial likelihood of a terrorist attack;” in disaster-response situations; in 
rescue operations; in circumstances where the person observed has given consent; and in other 
surveillance activities that are not related to criminal investigation.24  
                                                        
18 FLA. STAT. § 934.50(3)–(4) (2013). 
19 Id. 
20 FLA. STAT. § 934.50(6) (2013) 
21 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/10, 167/15(1)–(3) (2015). 
22 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/15(4)–(5) (2015) 
23 IND. CODE § 35-33-5-9(a) (2014) 
24 IND. CODE §§ 35-33-5-9(b)(1)(A)–(E), 35-33-5-9(b)(2) (2014). 
Oregon restricts law enforcement agencies’ use of information gathered by drones and 
provides that information obtained in violation of its laws will not be admissible in judicial 
proceedings.25 This information can be used at trial, however, when: a judge has issued a 
warrant; there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and exigent 
circumstances exist; the person or people observed have consented; the information has been 
collected during a response to an emergency; or the government has used the drones to observe 
and reconstruct a crime scene.26  
Tennessee’s law explicitly states that the government’s use of a drone to collect 
information is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as well as the Tennessee 
Constitution, and that evidence collected in violation of the statute is inadmissible in court.27 
Like many of the statutory schemes described in this subsection, Tennessee’s law goes on to 
state a number of exceptions to its warrant requirement, including: terrorist attack scenarios; 
situations where there is a risk of imminent harm to somebody’s life; and missing person 
searches.28  
Texas law prohibits the collection of images of a person or a person’s property with a 
drone if those images are collected with “the intent to conduct surveillance” on that individual or 
property.29 If images are collected in violation of the law, they may not be used as evidence at 
trial.30 Texas’s law provides for many exceptions to this warrant requirement, including 
situations when: the person observed consents; officers are pursuing a suspect; officers are 
                                                        
25 OR. REV. STAT. § 837.310 (2013) 
26 OR. REV. STAT. § 837.320(1)(a) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.320(1)(b) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.330 
(2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.335 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.340 (2013). 
27 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609(g) (2013) 
28 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609(d)(1), (3)–(5) (2013) 
29 TEXAS GOV. CODE ANN. § 423.003 (2013). The term “surveillance” is not defined. 
30 TEXAS GOV. CODE ANN. § 423.005 (2013) 
searching for a missing person; and officers are documenting a crime scene, or engaging in a 
“high-risk tactical operation that poses a threat to human life.”31 
One of the jurisdictions that has been in a dire need of the benefits provided by drone 
technology but unable to implement it due to the legislators’ difficulties in finding the proper 
balance for the legislative framework is California. While law enforcement in California has 
been using drones since 2006, California has been unable to pass legislation that will allow law 
enforcement to effectively utilize drones and protect civilian's personal liberty interests.32
 Lawmakers came close on September 8, 2014, when the California Assembly presented 
AB 1327 to the governor for approval.33 The bill allowed law enforcement to use drones without 
a warrant in emergency situations involving an imminent threat to life or great bodily harm. 34 
The proposed legislation also required public agencies to give the public reasonable notice 
before deploying unmanned aircraft systems. 35 The bill would also have required that images, 
footage, or data gathered from drones be destroyed within one year.36 Governor Brown, 
however, vetoed the bill because it was too narrowly drawn and would "impose requirements 
beyond what is required by either the Fourth Amendment or the privacy provisions in the 
California Constitution. "37 While the bill accounted for agency oversight and regulation, similar 
to existing legislations, it did not adequately address the real life implications of law enforcement 
                                                        
31 TEXAS GOV. CODE ANN. § 423.002(a)(6)–(9) (2013). 
32 Xeni Jardin, Launching 'Big Brother' Flying Drones Over L.A., NPR (Apr. 6, 2006, 1:00 PM). More recently, the 
Seattle Police Department gave the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) two Draganflyer X drones. News Release, Los Angeles Police Department, Office of 
Inspection General to House Two Unmanned Aerial Vehicles While Policy is Reviewed (Sept. 15, 2014) 
http://www.lapdonline.org/newsroon/news-view/56930. See David Kravets, California Cops Don't Need Warrants 
to Surveil with Drones, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 29, 2014, 9:25 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2014/09/california-cops-dont-need-warrants-to-surveil-with-drones/. 
33 Unmanned Aircraft Systems, A.B. 1327, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013-2014). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
operations. 38 The Governor's comments concerning his veto were brief, but his veto may suggest 
that drone laws should allow for reasonable suspicion as a justification for the use of drones. 39 
California's attempt to restrict drone usage shows the importance of privacy rights for citizens, 
but perhaps the Governor's view is the more realistic one. After all, "[s]uch a restriction [for law 
enforcement] may mean that the police will never be able to develop the probable cause 
necessary to get a warrant . . .”40 However, as discussed in Part IV of this paper, one way to 
account for existing technology and address implications for law enforcement operations while 
still placing necessary safeguards against privacy concerns is to pair drone technology with 
machine-learning algorithms to meet the probable cause requirement currently favored by the 
legislators.41  
III. CURRENT SURVEILLANCE STATE 
The first step to creating an effective drone surveillance legislative framework is to 
analyze what case law currently limits the use of drone technology and what the law currently 
permits in relation to drone surveillance based on previous technologies. Although there have 
been major developments in technology over the last few years, umanned aircraft systems 
or as they are commonly called “drones” are not a completely novel phenomenon. Aerial 
surveillance methods have been employed by law enforcement for decades and have led to 
some very significant precedent.  
                                                        
38 See Zusha Elinson, Brown Vetoes Bill Requiring Warrants for Drone Surveillance, WALL ST. J., 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/california-governor-vetoesbill-requiring-warrants-for-drone-surveillance- 1412007285 
(last updated, Sept. 29, 2014, 6:15 PM). 
39 Unmanned Aircraft Systems, A.B. 1327, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013-2014). 
40 Gregory S. McNeal, Poorly Drafted Drone Laws May Shield Crimes From View, FORBES (July 8, 2014, 6:55 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ gregorymcneal/2014/07/08/anti-drone-legislation-protects-animal-abuses-and-
othercrimes/. 
41 See Part V infra, discussion on page 39-40.  
Aerial observations of the curtilage of a home are generally not prohibited  by the Fourth 
Amendment, so long as the government is conducting the surveillance from public navigable 
airspace, in a non-physically intrusive manner, and the government conduct does not reveal 
intimate activities traditionally associated with the use of the home. The U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of aerial surveillance in a series of cases in the late 1980s:  
In California v. Ciraolo the Supreme Court held, “The Fourth Amendment was not 
violated by the naked-eye aerial observation of respondent’s backyard.”42 In Ciraolo, the police 
received a tip that someone was growing marijuana in the backyard at Ciraolo’s home.43 A police 
officer attempted to observe what was growing, but a six-foot high outer fence and a ten-foot 
high inner fence obscured his observations.44 The officer, suspicious that the fences might be 
intended to hide the growth of marijuana, obtained a private plane and flew over the backyard of 
Ciraolo’s property at an altitude of 1,000 feet.45 That altitude was within the FAA’s definition of 
public navigable airspace.46 The Supreme Court found that this was not a search, and therefore 
was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.47 In so finding, Chief Justice Burger stated that in 
erecting a 10-foot fence, Ciraolo manifested “his own subjective intent and desire to maintain 
privacy as to his unlawful agriculture” but his “intent and desire” did not amount to an 
expectation of privacy.48 The Court stated, “[i]n an age where private and commercial flight in 
the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants 
were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 
                                                        
42 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) 
43 Id. at 210. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 213. 
47 Id. at 214.  
48 Id. at 211.  
feet.”49 The Court noted that the fence “might not shield these plants from the eyes  of a citizen 
or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level  bus.”50 Accordingly, “it was not 
‘entirely clear’ whether [Ciraolo] maintained  a ‘subjective expectation of privacy from all 
observations of his backyard,’  or only from ground level observations.”51 The Court believed 
that it was unreasonable for Ciraolo to expect privacy in his backyard when a routine over flight, 
or an observation “by a power company repair mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard” would 
reveal exactly what the police discovered in their observation during the flight.52 
 At the same time that Ciraolo was decided, the Court in Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States articulated a similar theme, holding that the use of an aerial mapping camera to 
photograph an industrial manufacturing complex from navigable airspace similarly does not 
require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.53 In Dow Chemical Co., the Supreme Court did 
acknowledge that the use of technology might change the Court’s inquiry, stating, “surveillance 
of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available 
to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a 
warrant.”54 But then the Court dismissed the notion, stating “[a]ny person with an airplane and 
an aerial camera could readily duplicate” the photographs at issue.55 In short, the Court stated, 
“of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment.”56   
                                                        
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 212.  
52 Id. at 214-215.  
53 Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
54 Id. at 238.  
55 Id. at 231.  
56 Id. at 239.  
 Shortly after Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Co., the Supreme Court analyzed the use of 
helicopters for aerial surveillance. In Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth 
Amendment does not require the police traveling in  the public airways at an altitude of 400 feet 
to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”57 The Riley court found 
that the rule of Ciraolo controlled.58 Riley, just like Ciraolo, took measures that “protected 
against ground level observation” but “the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left partially 
open” just as the sky above Ciraolo’s yard, allowed one to look directly down into his yard.59 In 
Riley, the police flew a helicopter over Riley’s land, and observed marijuana plants growing in 
Riley’s greenhouse.60  
 The Court in Riley found that “what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to 
viewing from the air.”61 The police conduct in Riley was acceptable because the police were 
flying in publicly navigable airspace, “no intimate details connected with the use of the home or 
curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury.”62 
The Court continued, “[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley’s 
property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s greenhouse. 
The police officer did no more.”63 In an important passage, concurring in the judgment, Justice 
O’Connor noted “public use of altitudes lower than [400 feet]—particularly public observations 
from helicopters circling over the curtilage of a home—may be sufficiently rare that police 
                                                        
57 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) 
58 Id. at 449. 
59 Id. at 450. 
60 Id. at 448. 
61 Id. at 450. 
62 Id. at 452.  
63 Id. at 451.  
surveillance from such altitudes would violate reasonable expectations of privacy, despite 
compliance with FAA air safety regulations.”64  
 Thus, the law for at least the last 25 years has allowed the police to fly aircraft over 
private property, backyards, factory farms, industrial plants, and any other place where the 
average citizen may be able to see the property by the same means. The police may make 
observations from the air, just like a person on a commercial flight inbound to an airport can look 
down and observe the yards of people below and just like a utility worker on a pole can look 
down into an adjacent yard. Armed with that information, the police can use it to get a warrant to 
go in on foot and investigate what they previously observed from a lawful vantage point without 
a warrant.  
For more than two decades, the police have not been required to turn a blind eye to 
evidence of criminality merely because they observed it from the air, they similarly should not be 
required to ignore evidence of criminality merely because they witness the crime through the 
eyes of a drone. One important limitation on the use of the drone, however, should be a 
restriction to only allow the drone to be used in the public space, pursuant to the public view 
doctrine. Legislation should mandate for drones to be equipped with geofencing, which would 
block out people’s windows out of the view of the drone curtailing individual’s privacy 
concerns. Geofencing is a type of virtual barrier created by “a software program that uses the 
global positioning system (GPS) or radio frequency identification (RFID) to define geographical 
boundaries.65  
Another important body of law that was developed around use of technology for law 
enforcement surveillance is in the area of aural surveillance. Some of the current drone 
                                                        
64 Id. at 455.  
65 WhatIs.com, available at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/geofencing. 
technology is extremely small in size and can be equipped with high quality audio and video 
capabilities.66 The ability to capture audio during drone surveillance can be equivalent to 
traditional wiretapping that has been used by law enforcement in the past and presently, 
especially if the subject of surveillance is unaware that he is being observed by a drone.  
One of the most notable Fourth Amendment cases involving wiretap is Katz v. United 
States.67 Katz involved the wiretapping of a telephone conversation made by the defendant while 
in a phone booth.68 The Court stated: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”69  
From Katz, the Court’s current approach to determining the Fourth Amendment’s applicability 
emerged – the reasonable expectation of privacy test.70 The test, articulated in Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence, asks whether (1) a person exhibits an “actual or subjective expectation of privacy” 
and (2) “the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.”71 
One year after Katz, in 1968, Congress vastly expanded its statutory protections against 
electronic surveillance. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act extended the 
reach of wiretap regulations to state officials as well as to private parties.72 Despite its profound 
increase in the extent of protections, Title III had important limitations. It applied to the 
                                                        
66 In a study described by a freelance writer, Nsikan Akpan, it was revealed that drones already have technological 
capabilities such as “handling more than 7 g’s on a sharp turn to soaring at speeds up to 56.2 kilometers per hour” 
and further this technology is being developed to imitate birds so that drones are light enough and autonomously 
precise to be able to “[land] on a wire without stalling or navigating a tree-filled forest without crashing.” Editor’s 
Note, Contemplating the coming of drones, Science News, SOCIETY FOR SCIENCE AND THE PUBLIC, Feb. 7, 2015.  
67 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
68 Id. at 349. 
69 Id. at 351. 
70 Id. at 360. 
71 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
72 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 
interception of aural communications; it did not apply to visual surveillance or other forms of 
electronic communication.73  
Cases involving communications made between parties in person, as opposed to 
electronic mail, messaging or telephone fall under the ambit of “eavesdropping” cases. The 
admissibility of evidence secured by mechanical or electronic eavesdropping is dependent upon 
the fundamental principle that any evidence that is secured through the violation of certain 
constitutional rights, such as that pertaining to unreasonable search and seizure, is inadmissible 
as having been illegally obtained.74 While many of the cases antedating the formulation of this 
principle took a contrary view, the courts are now fairly uniform in holding that evidence need 
not be excluded merely because it was secured by means of mechanical or electronic 
eavesdropping so long as the circumstances attending the use or installation of the eavesdropping 
device did not involve such unlawfulness as contravened the rule against illegal obtention.75 
Many states have their own eavesdropping laws and restrictions on law enforcement and 
private eavesdropping. For example, California makes it a crime to record or eavesdrop on any 
confidential communication, including a private conversation or telephone call, without the 
consent of all parties to the conversation.76 The statute applies to "confidential communications" 
-- i.e., conversations in which one of the parties has an objectively reasonable expectation that no 
                                                        
73 See § 2510(1) 
74 See Am Jur, Evidence (1st ed §§ 393 et seq.) and Mapp v Ohio (1961) 367 US 643. 
75 While the foregoing statement finds almost unanimous support in the majority opinions of the courts, the vigorous 
dissents in the United States Supreme Court decisions on the general question of electronic surveillance are 
indicative that the rule of admissibility is by no means "well settled." Beginning with Justice Holmes's dictum in 
Olmstead v United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L ed 944, 48 S Ct 564, 66 ALR 376, characterizing the entire 
practice as "dirty business," and culminating in Lopez v United States (1963) 373 US 427, 10 L ed 2d 462, 83 S Ct 
1381, reh den 375 US 870, 11 L ed 2d 99, 84 S Ct 26, where four members of the court agreed that the rule of 
admissibility should not be "revitalized," arguments that the practice reeks of police state tactics and should be 
completely abolished have been in conspicuous evidence. A general discussion of the policy factors involved in the 
arguments for and against admitting evidence obtained by electronic surveillance would range far beyond the scope 
of this treatment but it should be noted that the very foundation of the rule of admissibility is still a matter of 
considerable argumentation. See the extended discussion of the general question in 44 Minn L Rev 813. 
76 See Cal. Penal Code § 632. 
one is listening in or overhearing the conversation.77 A California appellate court has ruled that 
this statute applies to the use of hidden video cameras to record conversations as well.78 Thus, 
although helpful in police investigations, drones should be equipped with aural surveillance 
capabilities only if state legislations already allow such use of technology.  
IV. APPLYING MACHINE LEARNING ANALYTICS TO DRONE TECHNOLOGY 
Some states have adopted legislations enabling law enforcement to use drones pursuant to 
certain limitations, many states cannot keep up with the rise of drone use by both law 
enforcement and recreational users, which has thus far been very loosely regulated.79 Although 
tracking drone sales has proven to be a difficult task, it is estimated that about 500,000 drones 
have been sold in 2014.80 Some of recreational drones are already in use and they have already 
been used to assist bad faith users in a number of criminal activities. For example,  
[i]n Latin America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has 
been collaborating with narcocartels to create remote-controlled drug-smuggling 
submarines capable of transporting 1,800 kilos of cocaine more than 1,000 miles 
(1,600 km) without refueling. In 2011, an al-Qaeda affiliate named Rezwan 
Ferdaus planned to launch an attack on the Pentagon and Capitol buildings using 
a remote-controlled drone aircraft laden with explosives until the FBI intercepted 
the plot. And just last year, criminals piloted a $600 remote-controlled quadcopter 
over a Brazilian prison fence to deliver cell phones to the incarcerated, as was 
also done in a 2009 attempt involving a drone to deliver drugs to prisoners in the 
U.K. A 50-ft. (15 m) electric fence may keep criminals in, but won’t keep a UAV 
drone out.  
 
Flying robots open up new opportunities for crime. Camera-equipped 
drones can and will be used for everything from the theft of industrial secrets to 
voyeurism by creepy neighborhood Peeping Toms. Some parents might 
use drones to follow their kids to school to ensure their safe arrival, but others will 
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exploit the technology to stalk ex-husbands and ex-wives. Worse yet, hobbyists 
have been attaching guns to quadcopters for at least five years. 81  
 
And yet current legislation for use of drones is either very cautious of giving the right to 
use drones to police in any meaningful way or fails to regulate law enforcement’s use of drones 
altogether leaving concerns for civil liberties completely unaddressed. To ban the use of drones 
by police enforcement is equivalent to giving criminals the advantage of sophisticated 
technology while denying it to law enforcement that is tasked with catching those criminals. This 
type of approach will not only be unfair but also impractical. On the other hand, allowing drone 
surveillance to go unregulated poses serious threats to individuals’ privacy and may result in 
unconstitutional surveillance practices. To ensure most effective and practical use of drones for 
surveillance purposes within the ambits of law, it is essential to define and identify what that 
specifically entails. Thus, the need for a comprehensive legislature for allowing the use of drones 
by police enforcement with important safeguards on the civil liberties, that this technology is 
criticized for encroaching, is instrumental.  They key in allowing and implementing drone 
surveillance in a practical and most efficient way and addressing citizens’ privacy concerns 
raised by this technology is to make sure that drones are used not in a broad general way, but 
rather in a controlled environment. Using drone surveillance in conjunction with machine 
learning analytics may be the only effective way to identify that environment while balancing 
police and citizens’ concerns.  
Drone surveillance can bring insurmountable benefits to law enforcement. The most 
important advantage to implementing drone use in police surveillance is the technology’s 
potential to increase both officer and civilians’ safety and its ability to save lives. Policing is a 
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dangerous job. There are over 100 officer fatalities every year and about 14,000 to 16,000 
officers are injured annually due to assaults.82 In neighborhoods where violent crime is most 
prevalent and officers feel unsafe, fear is getting in the way of policing.83 For example, in 2014 
following an assassination of two patrol officers, NYPD police was unwilling to make arrests or 
write summonses for minor crimes due to fear for their safety.84 “’I’m not writing any 
summonses. Do you think I’m going to stand there so someone can shoot me or hit me in the 
head with an ax?’” a police officer told The Post.85 “’I’m concerned about my safety,’ the cop 
added. ‘I want to go to home to my wife and kids.’”86 The violent environment that police 
officers are subjected to in the line of duty feeds into the “us versus them” mentality, akin to a 
warzone, that is employed by some of the officers.87  Police officers’ unwillingness to patrol the 
streets also causes fear and distress among the residents of crime-ridden neighborhoods.88 In a 
public housing development of Brooklyn, New York where police patrol decreased following the 
assassination of NYPD officers, some of the residents expressed increased fear for their safety.89 
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One of the residents stated that “[i]n the past, if she needed to send her teenage daughter to the 
corner store, she would wait until she saw a cop on the street. Now, she doesn't feel safe sending 
her daughter out alone any more.”90  
On the west coast, in one of the most violent neighborhoods dubbed as “the death 
valley,” police presence does little to prevent crime.91 On Vermont Avenue of L.A.’s Westmount 
neighborhood violence is an everyday occurrence.92 “In a county of 10 million people, Westmont 
is among the deadliest places to live. In the last seven years, 100 people — nearly all of them 
male — have been killed in the 1.8 square miles wedged between the city of Los Angeles and 
Inglewood.93 Times analysis of homicide data collected in that time found Westmont’s rate of 
killings to be the highest overall.”94 The streets of Westmont are not safe for anyone: not the 
adults and children who live there, not the police officers who patrol the neighborhood and not 
the nonprofit groups that try to remove the gang painted graffiti.95 According to the live data 
published by Los Angeles Times’ Homicide Report, 670 people were murdered in L.A. County 
in the past 10 months as of March 27, 2016.96 466 of those were killed by gunshot.97  
Violence is not the only reason police officers are hesitant to patrol dangerous areas. 
Baltimore residents saw a decline in police patrol following the controversial police brutality 
case of Freddie Grey who died while in police custody in 2015.98 While distrust of police grows 
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in the wake of publicized police brutality cases, officers claim that they are hesitant to do their 
job for fear of prosecution pursuant to a violent encounter at the time of an arrest.99 After the 
Baltimore riots in protest of police brutality following Freddie Grey’s death, violence in West 
Baltimore has surged.100 Baltimore experienced 40 shootings in less than a one week period 
resulting in 15 homicides.101 After the spike in violence, some residents wish for police to come 
back to the area.102 Antoinette Perrine, a West Baltimore resident “has barricaded her front door 
since her brother was killed three weeks ago on a basketball court near her home… She already 
has iron bars outside her windows and added metal slabs on the inside to deflect the gunfire. ‘I’m 
afraid to go outside,’ said Perrine, 47. ‘It’s so bad, people are afraid to let their kids outside. 
People wake up with shots through their windows. Police used to sit on every corner, on the top 
of the block. These days? They’re nowhere.’”103  
The deployment of drones will not solve all of the social problems and tensions that exist 
between police and civilians, but within a carefully crafted legislative framework, they can be the 
key to minimizing the safety risks of everyone involved. It is necessary, however, for legislators 
and citizens to understand that the effective use of drones will inevitably result in some privacy 
encroachments, but how far those encroachments will go and how necessary and justifiable they 
are should be determined keeping in mind the purpose of the use of drones - the prevention of 
violent crime.  
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Furthermore, there is a big difference in crafting a legislative framework for drone 
surveillance in response to crime that has already been committed and doing the same with the 
purpose of preventing violent crime. While employing a legislative framework where drones are 
used solely pursuant to warrants and emergency exceptions would permit a responsive method of 
policing by law enforcement, it would hinder proactive, preventive method of policing since 
officers will be restricted to the use of drone surveillance only after the crime has occurred or if it 
is already ongoing. Given the responsibilities and duties that local and state police is given today, 
preventive policing in not only desirably by society but is expected of law enforcement, 
however, current framework does not allow drone surveillance to be used for preventive 
purposes.  In the wake of local violence and the global war on terror, preventing violent crimes is 
becoming the forefront of policing. “Traditionally, local law enforcement has concerned itself 
primarily with preventing and solving crimes such as burglary, theft, and robbery — crimes that 
have an immediate and visible impact on the local community and affect citizen quality of life. 
In the face of unknown future terrorist threats, however, local law enforcement organizations 
will have to adapt existing policing strategies to fulfill the requirement of homeland security.”104  
Public events that draw large congregations of people are especially vulnerable to 
terrorist threats and other widespread violence. Populated events such as Christmas tree lighting 
ceremonies, marathons, parades and conventions have previously been targeted with threats of 
violence, some of which have and some of which regrettably haven not been prevented.105 
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Therefore drone use in those instances should be allowed with minimal restrictions. Law 
enforcement should be able to use drone surveillance of the immediate and surrounding areas at 
the time and in the hours before any public event.  
Use of drones in crowded places will give law enforcement an advantage over on-foot 
patrolling as it would give officers greater visibility and will allow them to move over crowds 
with ease, but simply using a drone camera to spot suspicious activity may not be the most 
efficient and effective method of preventing crime. Drone footage may be extremely helpful in 
identifying suspects after a crime was committed, but spotting suspicious activity among a large 
group of people is still a difficult task to complete if officers are simply using it in the same 
manner as a surveillance camera. When drafting drone legislation it is necessary to anticipate the 
technology that is probable and highly efficient for law enforcement to use in conjunction with 
drones. In this case, drones equipped with high-resolution cameras should be allowed to be used 
with analytics and biometrics software that identifies objects and people. Instead of officers 
looking through the footage captured by a drone, it is considerably more efficient for a drone 
camera to run its footage through analytical software. Modern biometrics systems and neural 
networks are highly accurate. At a GPU Technology Conference in 2015 when presenting 
research about machine learning technologies, one biometrics technology was found to have only 
a 0.15% error in a sample of 6,000 images. 106 This is a highly accurate outcome in a technology 
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that is still evolving everyday. Using this analytics technology and the help of drones, potential 
known suspects or wanted criminals can be identified in the masses of people at which point, if 
identified, a drone could stay with that person and follow him until the suspect is apprehended by 
officers.  
Also dangerous objects such as guns could be identified using neural network technology 
and nearby officers could get alerted with an image and location of the suspect until the suspect 
is apprehended or until the drone is given a signal that the suspect is not of interest so that the 
drone can move on in its surveillance.107 Other objects that could be identified and alerted are 
bags and backpacks. Besides getting the location of unattended bags or people with bags or 
backpacks of a certain size, analytics could be run on these bags right away and police officers 
may get information such as the approximate weight of the bag, approximate sex and age of the 
person carrying the bag and possibly even the identity of the person carrying the bag if that 
person is already in the police network because of a previous arrest or as a possible suspect. 
Similarly, as is the trend in most current legislations, deployment of drones should be authorized 
without prior judicial approval in emergency situations such as an active shooter or similar 
situation that would qualify for an emergency exception. Moreover, information obtained during 
drone use at either public events or emergency situations should be admissible in a prosecution 
within a state as would be any information obtained by a police officer in the normal patrol 
operation of such public spaces.  
On a broader scale, drone surveillance of public spaces should be allowed subject to 
specific safeguards that can be achieved with technological capabilities. One big misconception 
that critics of drones have about them is that drones are innately invasive machines that if 
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employed for surveillance purposes will be flying around, peeping in people’s windows and 
balconies gathering anything and everything about individuals’ private lives that will eventually 
force people into a state of constant surveillance of every move they make that can rival a 
totalitarian regime.108 Interestingly, this creates an image of an evil, autonomous machine, but as 
drone supporters pointed out at a Drone and Aerial Robotics Conference at New York 
University, the “drones are merely a technological platform, with a range of possibilities. They 
don’t spy, or kill; the people ordering them around do.” 109 In response to privacy concerns, a 
speaker at the conference replied: “[t]he public lost privacy via ‘cellphones, they lost it on GPS, 
they lost it on the Internet. They can’t get that genie back in the bottle.’”110 Although this harsh 
statement is partially true, it is important to note that while some privacy is voluntary given up 
through the use of cellphones, GPS and the Internet, although the use of these technologies for 
surveillance purposes is limited. Similarly, in the case of peeping Tom technologies, drones are 
not the only or the first technology that can be used by law enforcement in a similar manner. 
Long before conversations of drone use have begun, law enforcement implemented privacy 
eroding tech such as infrared cameras, gps tracking devices, CCTV cameras and manned aerial 
surveillance. Drones are not significantly different from surveillance methods that came before 
them, thus determining how they could or should be used is not breaking completely new 
ground, but rather could be done successfully taking existing legal landscape into account.  
Some legislation currently permits the use of drones only with a warrant, while others 
have less restrictive approaches.111 At least one police department was considering the use of 
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drones in areas with high probabilities of crimes called “hot spots” to monitor a certain 
geographical area.112 While many different approaches may be implemented and no one 
approach can be completely “perfect,” to develop the best approach in drone surveillance it is 
necessary to look at current legal framework of technologies leading up to the emergence of 
drones, current technological capabilities of emerging technology that is available right now as 
well as will be available in the next decade, costs to the police departments in implementing the 
use of these technologies and civil liberty and privacy concerns that arise out of the use of drones 
for surveillance purposes. One of such technologies is the predictive policing software already in 
use by some law enforcement agencies.  
Predictive policing is a scary term. When people think of predictive policing they tend to 
think about something akin to the popular science fiction movie “Minority Report” where a pre-
crime unit of a police department arrests “would-be murderers” for the crimes they are predicted 
to commit but have not yet committed.113 In the movie that’s set in 2054, the biggest pitfall of 
what was thought to be a highly successful method of fighting crime was revealed to be the 
notion that once people are aware of their future, they are able to change it, so the program is 
shut down and all of the prisoners are freed.114 This chilling picture of punishing people based 
only on the notion of probability is completely counter-intuitive to our society and the criminal 
justice system. Mathematical probabilities can abstract away from the specific facts of the case 
and as a substitute, it prods fact finders to derive their decisions from the general frequencies of 
events. For this reason, our courts apply mathematical probability only to a small number of 
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well-defined categories of cases such as defective products, doctors’ liability for patients’ lost 
chances to recover from illness, employers’ liability for discriminating against classes of 
employees, trademark infringers’ liability for consumer confusion, and the election law 
protection against redistricting manipulations.115 For factual determinations in other types of 
cases, mathematical probability is simply irrelevant, although it may play a role as part of an 
expert witness’s testimony that fact finders merge with the specifics of the case, as they often do 
with DNA evidence.116 
It follows then, that accusing a person of a crime based on a probability is fallacious and 
should always be forbidden. People are rightfully wary and outraged at the notion of accusing 
others of crimes they have not committed. However, this type of reference to law enforcement’s 
analytical techniques is very inaccurate and misunderstood. Unlike the characters of the movie, 
Minority Report, who are seers that can see into the future, machine learning technologies 
employed in data analytics are a purely scientific phenomenon based on existing facts.117  Even 
the word “predictive” is not an accurate description of what the analytics actually do, but rather 
the correct term to describe these scientific findings would be probabilistic.  
In today’s technologically evolving age we are no longer limited to the traditional 
sciences such as mathematics, biology and physics. Although originally born out of statistics, 
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data science has emerged as a separate area of study in the wake of modern day data mining 
technology. Vasant Dhar, a professor at the Stern School of Business and the Center for Data 
Science at New York University and the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Big Data, defines data 
science as the study of the generalizable extraction of knowledge from data. 118  
The significance of data science being categorized as an actual science is the general 
notion that science is accepted to be a reliable and precise body of knowledge. So why then is the 
biggest criticism of data science is its reliability? First, the problem lies in the use of probabilities 
as evidence. As discussed earlier, probabilities should be looked at with great caution. 119 
Probabilistic evidence is generally disfavored because probability is just that, a likelihood, it 
does not and should never be used to prove causation. However, knowledge of a high probability 
of an event happening is a powerful tool. Thus, when creating drone legislation probabilistic 
model can come as an extremely useful and powerful tool, but should not itself be used as 
evidence if it led to the apprehension of an offender if the crime does happen.  
The best and most efficient method of using a predictive analytical model is to use a 
certain degree of probability, for example an 80% likelihood that an individual will commit a 
crime as probable cause for the surveillance of that individual. After obtaining a warrant, based 
on these analytical finding drones can then be employed for surveillance purposes. It is important 
to keep in mind that the software that is run to develop these probabilities is a scientific tool and 
should be regarded in that manner. To guarantee a certain degree of accuracy of the analytical 
model itself, the algorithms chosen in the predictive software to determine those probabilities 
should be validated, tested and submitted for outside study as is required for other forensic law 
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enforcement tools.120 Furthermore, as would be expected from any other scientific tool, the 
software should be tested by not only law enforcement personnel but primarily by academics and 
scholars who are experts in the field of data science.121 Although this approach to development 
of predictive software may be met with criticism from law enforcement agents who will want to 
maintain the secrecy of the software in order to ensure that it does not get into the hands of the 
wrong people and that its vulnerabilities will not be exploited, it is a necessary measure to ensure 
a basic level of transparency from the methods used by law enforcement and a necessary 
safeguard in ensuring the legitimacy of the software and its use.  
  Some police departments have already developed predictive policing models of 
identifying and fighting crimes and have even planned to adopt that technology in identifying 
areas for drone surveillance.122 “PredPol is now being used in a third of the LA Police 
Department’s 21 geographical policing divisions… [and] dozens of other cities across the US 
and beyond are using the PredPol software” including police departments in Atlanta, Seattle and 
Kent, England.123 Every police department uses this software differently, mostly targeting areas 
and times where crime may be committed as opposed to identifying individuals who may 
commit it and the software is mostly concentrated on specific types of crimes such as property, 
robberies, drug crimes or gun violence.124 Captian of the Los Angeles Police Department, John 
Romero, pointed out that identifying geographical areas where crime is most likely to be 
committed based on previous statistics is a practice that has been widely used by police 
departments world-wide since the 1990s, but “the [predictive] algorithm is doing much more 
                                                        
120 See NIST. (Nov 2001). General Test Methodology for Computer Forensic Tools. www.cftt.nist.gov/Test 
Methodology.doc pp. 1-8, 2001. 
121 Id. 
122 Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-style, THE GUARDIAN, June 25, 2014.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
than just telling cops what they already know, ‘it’s using much larger collections of data, and 
processing it in a much more sophisticated mathematical way that allows you to produce 
significant boosts over just hotspot mapping alone,’ explained Jeffrey Brantingham, professor of 
anthropology at UCLA who helped develop LAPD’s predictive software.125 Interestingly, the 
article is silence regarding whether this software has been tested and if so how and by whom and 
what types of data other than previous crimes is used by the algorithms.  
Another example where analytical software aided law enforcement is in a study of 
computer pattern analysis in one of the unsolved homicide cases in Louisiana.126 In a 
collaborative effort, researchers in neural network analysis with the Jennings Police Task force 
combined text mining with point-pattern analysis to a high-profile homicide series case that was 
attributed to a serial killer.127 Information that was analyzed was taken from Orion, a web-based 
database that can be accessed by local, state, and federal law enforcement officials, made up of 
“Information Packages” that contain email correspondence, transcribed face-to-face interviews 
and phone calls.128 The text mining and point pattern analysis specifically focused on the eighth 
and last victim of the homicide series analyzing 172 individual information packages that were 
connected or associated with the victim.129 This data-mining approach is useful because it is 
done faster then an analysis by a person and the algorithm is able to draw connections between 
various factors in evidence that may be missed by investigators because they are not readily 
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apparent to a human and because the sheer volume of the data makes it hard to effectively piece 
together the details and draw the connections.130 The study stated that “[t]he results from this 
data mining exercise have already been presented to and shared with the Jennings Task Force, 
which confirmed that this information was previously unknown and may provide new and 
important clues in this criminal investigation. However, due to confidentiality reasons and this 
being still an open criminal investigation, the authors of this research cannot go into more detail 
as far as the specifics of this ‘previously unknown information’ and ‘new and important clues’ 
are concerned.”131 
Both the LAPD PredPol software and the Jennings pattern analysis study demonstrate the 
value and assistance data analytics provide to law enforcement agencies. With the information 
overload that police forces are faced with as a result of American social networking culture, it is 
next to impossible for law enforcement officials to sift through the data that they have access to 
and make sense of it on their own. Data mining and analytics software is evolving at an 
insurmountable speed and will likely be widely employed by law enforcement in the near future 
regardless of individual’s feelings towards this technology. Already, one of the Big Data leaders, 
Information Builders is offering law enforcement agencies a software service, Law Enforcement 
Analytics (LEA), a cross-platform data-mining and analytics technology with geographical 
reporting and mapping and predictive analysis capabilities.132 Michigan State Police Department 
and Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department are at least two police departments that are 
already using LEA.133     
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Although, allowing analytical software to identifying geographical areas is a good way to 
allocate what areas are most in need of surveillance and to determine where to allocate drones for 
surveillance purposes, it may create some undesirable consequences. From the standpoint of 
allocation of resources, it makes sense that surveillance should be done where it’s most needed. 
Resources are not unlimited, thus an effective way to allocate them is key in efficient and 
effective policing. However, albeit being an obvious and common sense choice directing drones 
to crime hot spots for surveillance purposes may not be the most desirable way to allocate those 
resources. One possible issue with continuous surveillance of a specific geographical area is that 
it may result in continuous surveillance in a specific individual or group of individuals without a 
probable cause warrant. To address questions of pervasive surveillance courts have previously 
decided cases related to GPS surveillance practices.  
United States v. Knotts was one of the first cases to apply the Fourth Amendment to the 
use of a tracking device.134 Knotts upheld the use of a tracking beeper device that had been 
placed in a container of choloroform that was sold to the defendant with the suspicion that was 
bought for use in drug manufacturing.135 The police followed the cars in which the container was 
placed with a monitor receiving the beeper signals, lost contact once, and found the beeper signal 
again, stationary at a cabin in Wisconsin.136 The officers used that information to secure a search 
warrant for the cabin.137 They found a drug laboratory in the cabin and the container of 
chloroform outside.138 The Court decided there was no intrusion into the defendants’ reasonable 
expectation of privacy because the location of the car containing the container had been 
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voluntarily conveyed to the public – the car was driven on public roads and the container was 
placed in open fields clearly visible from public spaces.139  
One year after Knotts, the Court decided a second “beeper” case, United States v. Karo 
that distinguished the heightened privacy interests in a private residence.140 In Karo, the item 
tracked with a beeper was brought into a private residence.141 DEA agents had learned that the 
defendants ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, who told the agents that 
the ether was to be used to extract cocaine from clothing that was imported to the United 
States.142 The agents obtained an order authorizing the installation of a beeper in one of the 
houses.143 Determining the can of ether was inside one of the houses, the agents obtained a 
search warrant, found the cocaine, and arrested the defendants.144 The Court held that the transfer 
of a can containing an unmonitored beeper conveyed no information the recipient wished to keep 
private, so it conveyed no information at all.145 It also did not interfere with a possessory interest 
in a meaningful way so no Fourth Amendment interest was infringed.146 
It also concluded that it would be a search to surreptitiously enter a residence without a 
warrant to verify that a container was there, but that is not what was done here because the chain 
of custody could have been observed by merely watching the ether travel on the public highways 
to the house from the outside of the curtilage. 147 
In 2001, the Court applied some of these principles to heat-sensing technology used to 
detect the heat signature of marijuana-growing lights emanating from the walls and roof of a 
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suspect’s house.148 The Court held that the use of sense-enhancing technology to gather 
information about the interior of a home that could not otherwise be obtained absent physical 
intrusion into the home requires a warrant “at least where the technology in question is not in 
general public use.149  
This was the jurisprudential contest in which the Supreme Court decided its first GPS 
case, United States v. Jones.150 The question in Jones was whether police had violated the Fourth 
Amendment in placing a GPS tracker on a suspect’s car and tracking the car for twenty-eight 
days without a warrant.151 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia chose not to follow the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry and instead applied the physical trespass test, 
holding that placing the GPS device on the car constituted a physical trespass, so the warrantless 
search violated the Fourth Amendment.152 Justice Scalia reasoned that under the common-law 
trespassory test, the government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information.153 Such a physical intrusion would have been considered a "search" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.154 Defendant possessed the 
vehicle at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device.155  
The Government forfeited its alternative argument that officers had reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause.156 Justice Scalia declined to decide the reasonable expectation of privacy 
question.157 However, in Justice Alito’s four-justice concurrence and Justice Sotomayor’s 
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separate concurrence, five justices applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test.158 Justice 
Alito argued that the four-week tracking in Jones violated society’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, but that a shorter-term tracking might not.159 Justice Sotomayor went further and noted 
the privacy implications of location tracking: it could capture “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic 
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense 
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay 
bar and on and on.”160 Such information can create “a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”161  
Unlike a camera on a public street near someone’s house or apartment building that may 
capture repeated footage of the same person passing on the street at particular times, drones will 
not be stationary. There would be no benefit to employ a drone over using a camera if law 
enforcement intended to use the drone itself as a CCTV camera. Drones will move over a 
specific geographical area. If one or more drones move over the same urban geographical area 
over a prolonged period of time, that drone may capture footage of an individual leaving their 
house to go to work which may or may not be nearby, then meeting with their friend at a bar 
down the street, coming home late at night, visiting the neighbor’s house the next night, 
associating with friends who live in the same neighborhood on the weekend. This type of profile 
that is built over time is beyond what a stationery camera can capture and depending on the 
person’s lifestyle can be very similar to GPS surveillance. What would be more disturbing is that 
the only thing separating a person under constant, continuous surveillance from a person who is 
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not would be their geographical presence – where they happen to live, work and socialize. Thus, 
a housewife and a stay at home mother who spend most of their time at home, at the park down 
the street and the grocery stores a few blocks away would be under continuous surveillance 
because they are in a target neighborhood where the drone is deployed but a criminal who lives, 
engages in criminal activities and works at different geographical areas of substantial distance 
from each other would not. This surveillance technique could adversely impact individuals in a 
way that Justice Sotomayor has cautioned of in Jones.162 
Although drone surveillance by geographical locations does not fall squarely into the 
ambit of Jones, Kyllo or Karo because under this surveillance approach a drone would not 
consistently follow a specific person within the geographical area, nothing would get attached to 
a person’s property and with the help of geofencing, private spaces would be safe from 
surveillance, those cases demonstrate that use of technologies to conduct pervasive surveillance 
of individuals is disfavored by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, in 2010, in yet another GPS 
surveillance case in the Superior Court of Delaware, Judge Jurden expressed concerns created by 
pervasive surveillance through modern technology such as the GPS that eerily reflect continuous 
drone surveillance of specific areas. 163 In United States vs. Holden, the court concluded that, 
absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless placement of a GPS device to track a suspect 24 
hours a day constituted an unlawful search.164 While individual have a diminished expectation of 
privacy in their vehicles, prolonged GPS surveillance provides more information that one 
reasonable expects to expose to the public.165 In addition, the court concluded “even if there is no 
reasonable expectation to be free from casual encounters by others in the public sphere, society 
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reasonably expects to be free from constant police scrutiny.”166 In analyzing GPS surveillance’s 
violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, Judge Jurden stated:  
Prolonged GPS surveillance provides more information than one reasonably 
expects to "expose to the public." The whole of one's movement over a prolonged 
period of time tells a vastly different story than movement over a day as may be 
completed by manned surveillance. GPS "facilitates a new technological 
perception of the world in which the [location] of any object may be followed and 
exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically unlimited period." It takes 
little to imagine what constant and prolonged surveillance could expose about 
someone's life even if they are not participating in any criminal activity.  
GPS surveillance does not simply enhance an officer's sensory capabilities and 
represents more than a mere alternative to conventional physical surveillance. 
GPS has the capacity for obtaining and recording information which greatly 
exceeds the ability of conventional surveillance such that "[t]he potential for a 
similar capture of information or 'seeing' by law enforcement would require, at a 
minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on every street 
lamp." The possibility is remote that law enforcement could maintain 24-hour 
surveillance of a suspect for a prolonged period of time. There is a "difference 
between [] uninterrupted, [constant] surveillance possible through use of a GPS 
device, which does not depend upon whether an officer could in fact have 
maintained visual contact over the tracking period, and an officer's use of 
binoculars or a flashlight to augment his or her senses." GPS completely replaces 
conventional surveillance such that one officer with a single computer could 
record and monitor the travels of hundreds into perpetuity.167 
 
Although the court seems to be concerned with pervasive surveillance of individuals, this 
concern can be cured with restrictions on duration of surveillance of a particular area and 
restrictions against targeting of individuals focusing instead on surveillance of an area rather than 
a person or group of people. Moreover, with geofencing, drones can be limited only to the plain 
view of public places analogous to investigative surveillance.  
Another possible civil liberty concern that can arise with the geographical allocation of 
drones is a disproportional effect on certain neighborhoods and racial profiling. Racial profiling 
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has been an issue of public debate for decades and can be traced back as a practice to the 
1700s.168 Racial profiling can be defined as “the use of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or 
national origin by law enforcement agents as a factor in deciding whom to investigate, arrest or 
detain absent evidence of a specific crime or criminal behavior.”169 Racial profiling impacts 
people of African American and Hispanic descents and Muslim religions in their day-to-day 
lives.170  
In publicized police brutality cases police violence and use of deadly force has also been 
often attributed to racial profiling or at the very least the individuals’ bias created due to racial 
profiling.171 Police Departments do not deny this practice, in an interview with the Newark-Star 
Ledger, a New Jersey State Police Superintendent admitted that his department targets minorities 
in narcotics investigations because they are usually the ones involved in those crimes.172 New 
York Police Department has also admitted to targeting minorities in stop and frisk searches 
because minority neighborhoods are the places where most of the crime occurs and minority 
groups are statistically responsible for the majority of violent crimes.173 “This type of thinking 
means that anyone who is African American is automatically suspect during every drive to work, 
the store, or a friend’s house. Suspicion is not focused on individuals who have committed 
crimes, but on a whole racial group. Skin color becomes evidence, and race becomes a proxy for 
general criminal propensity.”174  
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One of the insurmountable advantages of analytics software is that they are colorblind. 
Analytics are done based on a variety of facts, but machines simply make objective connections 
between those facts, they are not influenced by any innate bias and factors such as race, 
ethnicity, gender, religion and national origin can and should be left out of the analytics equation 
altogether. Thus, when making a profile of suspects and areas of probable crimes, the findings 
will be based on the factual investigative factors such as criminal history, witness interviews, 
information obtained by confidential informants, public information obtained through public 
social media sources and the like. However, if geographical drone surveillance is employed, this 
will not eliminate a disproportionate impact on minority communities and underprivileged 
communities. Statistically, crime happens to a greater degree in impoverished and minority 
neighborhoods, thus that population will be targeted the most. However, that means that for 
example, sprawling estates of Alpine, New Jersey will have no surveillance of residents, while 
equally law abiding residents of impoverished areas of Newark, New Jersey will inevitably be 
subjects to continuous, pervasive surveillance.175 In considering whether such practices should 
be allowed legislators might consider two approaches: the security trumps approach or the 
probable cause approach.   
Legislators may choose to allow this disproportionate impact on certain neighborhoods, 
because arguably safety trumps a disproportionate impact of inconvenience and privacy 
encroachments of a few people. This approach is defended by one of the leading scholars in the 
area of privacy and security, Kenneth Himma, in a chapter of the book Privacy, Security and 
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Accountability.176 Himma argues that security trumps privacy and thus legitimizes certain 
privacy encroachments because being protected from violent acts of assault and theft is ranked 
more importantly then any privacy interest possessed by any given individual and because the 
government has a duty to protect its country and citizens from violence.177 In essence, Himma 
says that physical security is always more important than privacy and should trump privacy 
interests when security and privacy are in conflict.178 When looking at especially dangerous 
neighborhoods in the U.S. such as the L.A. street nubbed the Death Valley because of its 
violence and homicide rates or the physical threat and fear faced by people of Baltimore after the 
protests that caused reduction in police patrol, Himma’s reasoning is demonstrated at its core.179 
In those situations and neighborhoods where violence is prevalent and residents are confronted 
with fear of physical harm on an everyday basis, it is hard to argue that residents’ need for 
security and state officials’ moral obligation and legal duty to provide it doesn’t outweigh the 
need for privacy. Himma argues that there’s an hierarchy of collective and individual rights and 
although security and privacy are both important, security interest “construed to include freedom 
from grievous threats to well-being, which include death, grievous bodily injury, and financial 
damage sufficiently extensive to threaten the satisfaction of basic needs, and hence survival, of a 
person — are at the top of the moral hierarchy, encompassing as they do the rights to life and 
physical preservation.”180 In Himma’s view because security is essential to survival, and privacy 
is not, security interests will always trump the need for privacy where protecting individuals’ 
privacy threatens physical security of others.181  
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It is of no doubt that the physical security of life and limb is one of the most important 
moral and legal interests of all people, but whether physical security is always easily trumped by 
privacy is a heavily contested notion by many scholars. For example, Bruce Schneier pointed to 
the psychological impacts of surveillance on individuals stating that empirical data supports that 
surveillance makes people feel like prey.182 Thus, although a lack of privacy may theoretically 
provide greater physical security, it may also have very detrimental psychological impacts that 
are not justified by physical security interests surveillance purports to protect.183 Another scholar, 
Annabelle Lever, argued that surveillance might not even provide the benefit of physical 
security. In her view, impersonal surveillance conflicts with principals of democracy and is an 
arbitrary application of power that may actually diminish security for people on the margins of 
society.184  
The security trumps approach justifies prolonged drone surveillance in neighborhoods 
with high rates of violent crimes. However, the best way to protect privacy interests and 
discourage the possibility of profiling is to tailor the use of drone surveillance to limit the effects 
of pervasive surveillance. One way to do this is to limit the duration of surveillance in any one 
geographical area when using the hotspot model of surveillance. If drones are deployed only for 
a limited time, possibility of pervasive surveillance of specific residents of the neighborhood is 
then limited. However, it is unclear how this approach will be beneficial since it would be highly 
improbable to predict the time and location of a violent crime, therefore if drones are deployed to 
any given place for a short time, it is unclear if it would ever be deployed to the right place at the 
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time of a crime, but further research may be conducted to check the effectiveness of this 
approach.  
 The second approach to drone surveillance, using machine-learning analytics is the 
probable cause approach. This approach would allow law enforcement to use drones for 
individual surveillance upon finding probable cause for such surveillance. Although this 
essentially requires a search warrant similar to many existing legislations, the use of analytical 
software can aid law enforcement in identifying suspects and meeting the probable cause 
standard. Machine learning software can create suspect profiles based on information in public 
online spheres and police databases such as Orion and LEA, similar to what the Chicago Police 
is already doing with their predictive policing software.185 Chicago Police Department uses an 
algorithm to compile a “heat list,” a report that ranks high probability suspects at risk of 
committing violent crimes.186 This approach is highly criticized, because Chicago Police 
Department has not disclosed a comprehensive description of the algorithm’s input.187  
“Chicago’s experiment is one of several of a new type, in which police departments move 
beyond traditional geographic “crime mapping” to instead map the relationships among city 
residents. Specifically, identifying individuals for tailored intervention is the trend most likely to 
expand in the future of predictive policing…”188  
 As discussed earlier, this type of machine learning software could be extremely helpful in 
allowing police to use drones in the most efficient and effective way.189 If an algorithm goes 
through hundreds or thousands of different pieces of documents, evidence and information and 
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maps the relationships between people and crime, then pointing to the existence of probable 
cause of an individual committing a crime, then that evidence should in fact be treated as 
probable cause evidence allowing surveillance of that individual.190 It is important to keep in 
mind that the police would not be arresting people on the probability that they will commit a 
crime; instead they would obtain evidence in the more efficient way of piecing evidence 
together through use of an algorithm rather than manpower.  
Furthermore, the technology can be designed with certain standards and limits in place to 
ensure safeguards against its misuse and inaccuracy. Caracterizing predictive policing software 
as a forensic tool will ensure that it is properly tested and in the most effective manner.191 
Moreover, as with any data that is handled by law enforcement - transparency, auditing and due 
diligence procedures are imperative to ensure government accountability and oversight over its 
use of the data.  
V. CONCERNS 
One limitation that should be put on the use of drones in any circumstance is equipping 
the drone with lethal or non-lethal weapons. Currently, a North Dakota House Bill permitting 
drone use by law enforcement with certain limitations prohibits the equipment of drones with 
only lethal weapons, which means that drones can be equipped with non-lethal weapons such as 
tasers, rubber bullets or tear gas.192 It is easy to see the benefit of arming a drone for the purpose 
of preventing a crime. A suspect can be quickly neutralized by a drone that is likely to have a 
higher precision and accuracy rate than a human wielding the same weapon, but the one thing a 
machine will always lack over humans is the ability to make judgment calls, thus weaponized 
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drones should never be employed to use weapons autonomously based on neural network 
analytics. Another issue with weaponizing a drone is the fact that machines may sometimes 
malfunction. Imagine a law-abiding person minding their own business at a parade or a 
convention being shot with a taser or something along the lines of a tranquilizer due to a 
malfunction of the drone. Even if the margin of a possible malfunction is so small that there is 
only a 1% chance of that happening, that is a chance that a completely innocent person may be 
harmed by the technology. That chance is almost completely eliminated if the drone is not 
weaponized. With current technology drones can be so light and small in size that even if a 
malfunction will cause it to fall and crash into a person, the person will be unlikely to sustain any 
real injuries.193  
In an article criticizing North Dakota’s bill for failure to ban non-lethal weaponization of 
drones, ACLU outlined some other reasons why weaponization should not be allowed.194 Among 
them is the ease with which non-lethal force is used and the potential to overuse such force when 
operating a robotic device without the officer’s physical presence at the scene; the fact that 
nonlethal weapons do routinely kill people, for example, there has been at least 39 deaths in 2015 
as a result of using tasers where about 90% of the victims were unarmed; the officers will more 
likely to experience flawed judgments if their perception of the situation is over a greater 
distance and where they are not physically present; weaponization of drones with non-lethal 
weapons is a slipper slope to weaponizaton of drones with fully lethal weapons; and 
weaponization of drones will increase the militarization of police which may shift law 
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enforcement approach from a community policing model into a greater militarized “us versus 
them” mentality.195 Of these, a particularly important factor to consider in weaponization of 
drones is the potential to overuse weapons because while drones are extremely useful tools for 
surveillance purposes, they are also extremely impersonal. This impersonal nature of drones does 
not create any physical harm when it is employed for observational and identification purposes, 
but when used in a tactical nature there is more concern with the use of the drones since the 
distance and lack of physical presence of an officer may lead to dehumanization of his or her 
actions making it easier to use force in a much more liberal fashion then during a face to face 
interaction.196 As in the case of use of robotic lethal force in military operations “[t]he greater the 
distance between the killer and the victim, the less emotional restraint that will be shown on the 
part of the former,” the same outcome would likely result in the implementation of robotic non-
lethal force.197  
Legislators may be swayed towards weaponization of drones in highly dangerous 
environments involving active shootings and hostage situations where weaponized drones could 
have the potential to save civilian and officers’ lives. To mitigate security risks with concerns 
regarding use of robotic weaponization, a very narrow exception to weaponized drones may be 
carved out. Law enforcement may have a separate type of weaponized drone that may be 
deployed only when faced with an active shooter or a hostage situation that poses a risk to 
human life. The drone should not be autonomous, it should be operated by a trained officer, who 
identifies and confirms the target and gives the drone a command to use the appropriate force on 
that target. In making the judgment call to use the force, the officer may take into considerations 
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neural network analytics that are presented through use of drones such as the probability that the 
suspect is in fact in possession of a gun or a grenade or similar lethal weapon only as an aid to 
help his own observation (such analytics could be helpful in assessing the situation but the use of 
force should be a carefully made judgment call by the officer), the officer should be able to see 
the weapon and asses the suspect’s danger through the footage transmitted by the drone and 
should only use the weapon if he sees no safer alternative to neutralize the suspect. The drone 
should also be equipped with communication technology to make possible negotiations with the 
suspect. The most important aspect to this exception is that a drone used in this situation should 
be a specialized drone employed in a known, ongoing, extremely dangerous situation. Drones 
used for surveillance purposes of places or individuals should never be equipped with either 
lethal or non-lethal weapons.  
Another very worrying considerations in the use of any modern day technology is that it 
can be hacked. Drones that are operated to survey a certain area or a certain person can be 
hacked and operated by criminal parties to redirect it to another area or another person during the 
commission of the crime. A police department may be hacked in an attempt to erase footage of 
criminal activity that is captured by a drone or predictive policing software can be hacked to 
manipulate the data that is used by algorithms. In extreme cases, data or video footage may even 
be manipulated to “frame” another person for a crime that someone else has committed. 
Although these types of vulnerabilities should be examined and considered very carefully when 
designing and security the technology; they should not serve to prevent the use of the technology 
altogether. Typically, this sort of hacking is fairly sophisticated and cannot be done by someone 
who is only marginally versed in this type of technology. Also, if drones are implemented to 
target primarily suspects of violent crimes as opposed to white-collar crime, then the amount of 
people with enough knowledge that would enable them to hack into a police framework would 
be limited since it is usually white collar criminals who are more sophisticated and educated in 
fields such as computer science. Of course, this does not mean that violent criminals are 
absolutely not capable or are not intelligent enough to eliminate them as potential threats and the 
subjects of surveillance are not necessarily the only ones who can attempt hacking a law 
enforcement drone or computer system, but any technologically based system could theoretically 
be hacked and yet we do not propose that businesses and individuals should never use internet or 
that credit card transactions should be absolute in light of data breach threats, instead we expect 
better designed and more secure systems. Data used by police department is highly sensitive, but 
so is data used by banks and medical providers, yet it is not a popular argument that we shouldn’t 
provide them with that data altogether. People take it as a granted that providing sensitive 
personal information to banks and medical providers is necessary for them to do their job, but do 
not give the same considerations to police. Similarly, studies should be conducted regarding the 
security measures and vulnerabilities of technologies involved in drone policing and legislation 
allowing drone surveillance should mandate that police departments take reasonable measures to 
protect it systems and data from third party breaches.  
Another possible threat to drones could be physical damage. If spotted, drones could be 
taken down with a gun or other similar measure. Current technologies also make it easier to 
determine if there are any drones nearby. For example, a company called DroneShield provides 
acoustic sensors to identify drones in the area based on the unique noises that their motors 
make.198 Another company, Drone Labs has drone detection technology that uses radio waves 
that can alert users through text messages, app notifications or email about a detected drone in 
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their area, while a France-based company MALOU Tech developed a manually operated drone 
that could capture other drones by firing a net.199 Though currently these companies’ clients are 
lawful entities that consist mostly of government agencies, airports, sports stadia, and celebrities 
who are concerned about uses of drones for unlawful purposes, it is easy to predict that the roles 
can be easily reversed and the same technology could be used against police drones by the 
criminals they are employed to survey.200   
It is unclear what measures if any can be taken to prevent police drones from being 
detected as technologies on both sides of the spectrum will continue to evolve, but if a drone is 
captured there are different factors that that are both comforting and disturbing in determining 
the repercussions.  First, if a drone is captured, that does not mean that any data can or will be 
recovered from the drone. Drones shouldn’t store any data on the hard drive of the drone itself, 
rather drones should stream whatever footage they capture to a secure server where the data is 
encrypted and can be accessed by authorized police personnel only. Next, despite an offender’s 
inability to access data captured by the drone, loss of the drone itself can cause a great cost to the 
department. Although drones are becoming increasingly cheap, it is unclear how much police 
drones would cost to the department, what capabilities they will ultimately be equipped with and 
how much its network configurations that will communicate with the police command centers 
and servers will contribute to the overall cost of an individual drone. Also, to accurately analyze 
costs we of course would have to know the extent of the damage to a drone and the frequency of 
such damage and the types of drones employed. These costs may either be very significant or 
largely insignificant.  For example, if swarming is used, then each drone is relatively inexpensive 
and concerns over one drone being taken down are curtailed by the fact that there are several 
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others in the same location and depending on different factors it may be extremely difficult to 
capture or detect all of them because of the size of these drones.  
Legislators should keep in mind that while damage of drones may be addressed by 
existing legislations dealing with damage of police property, capturing or interfering with police 
drone operations may have to be addressed as a separate infraction to deter such instances.   
CONCLUSION 
Drones are a truly transformative technology that is growing, evolving and being utilized 
with an unbelievable speed comparable to the Internet and the evolution of computer technology 
in the late 1980s. As opposed to computers and the Internet in that era, however, we are better 
equipped and able to predict the issues we are likely to face with utilization of drones on a day-
to-day basis. Although not so long ago, privacy violations by computers were very hard to 
visualize because people could not even imagine that somewhere, somehow, by the use of 
malware, phishing or bot nets bits of information may be correlated to consumers and regular 
internet users’ detriment, the evolution of drone technology does not have to pose the same risk. 
Drones are not completely novel, so people understand them on a deeper level. We realize the 
potential of drones and can predict the type of technology that is expected to emerge in the next 
ten years, such as swarming drones, and craft our legislation to address the issues that it may 
create. Mere lack of education about the technology should not serve as an obstacle to better and 
more effective use of that technology. Legislators should not be afraid to do what they have been 
doing for centuries prior to the emergence of robotics – balance the law enforcements’ use of the 
latest technology for enhanced investigative techniques, officer security and protection of 
citizens with individual personal liberties and come up with a reasonable solution for all parties.  
In creating drone legislation, legislators should focus on what rights they want to protect 
and what surveillance capabilities they want to enable law enforcement with and tailor the 
legislation to allow the type of technology that will enable law enforcement to do their job in the 
most effective way while preventing any predictable abuses of the technology. The key point in 
creating legislation is that any potential abuses can be cured with technological restrictions rather 
then a restriction on the use of the technology itself as a whole. Geofencing can limit 
surveillance to only the plain view in public spaces, time limitations can restrict the use of 
pervasive surveillance, encryption can protect arbitrary access of data, while analytics can help 
with identifying suspects and suspicious activities.  Strict restrictions on the use of technology in 
law enforcement investigative and policing duties will result in restrictions on police capabilities 
to secure the safety of its citizens. Thus, to ensure that drone technology benefits law 
enforcement and serves to ensure the safety of civilians without jeopardizing their civil liberties, 
legislators should work closely with engineers, not lawyers to understand the best way to achieve 
their goal.  
